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1. Courtesies: Rear Admiral W. D. (Dick) Robertson, Vice Director for Production, DIA, is chairman of the seminar, but you may find Gene Tighe, Hal Aaron, and/or Dan Murphy in attendance for your session.
2. Subject is "National Organization for Warning." A number of threads are coming together here:
  - Reorganization of the Community, which has caused DCI to delay looking at warning until recently.
  - Congressional pressures for DCI to establish "clear focus for warning."
  - Concerns expressed at this table last winter over absence of national-level leadership.
3. Before presenting the DCI's approach to this problem, would like to discuss some of the requirements for a warning system:
  - It must take into account the full range of warning, from the coup in Dahomey to the strategic war.
  - It must be sensitive to those events at lower levels of criticality which could escalate to much higher levels.
  - It must be able to focus increasing intelligence effort on developments as they increase in criticality.

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- It must marry the relatively less structured<sup>ED</sup> approach of CIA and State in economic and political matters with the highly structured<sup>ED</sup> approach to military indication<sup>ED</sup> of DIA and NSA.
- It must achieve a balance whereby the DoD can meet its departmental warning responsibilities while the DCI meets his national ones.
- It must integrate collection and production.
- Because warning, and most especially strategic warning, is the first responsibility of all intelligence organizations and personnel, it must incorporate disciplines that maintain awareness of that responsibility.
- It must incorporate mechanisms to challenge conventional thinking and bring out alternate hypotheses.
- It nonetheless must place primary reliance where it belongs, on line organizations.
- Finally, and no less important, it must incorporate mechanisms by which the policy officer knows he is being warned.

4. To meet all these is a tall order. But present arrangements are clearly inadequate:

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- Most would agree that the old Watch Committee and National Indications Center needed radical change.
  - But in disestablishing them, we went much too far:
    - At the working end, we replaced the NIC with the Strategic Warning Staff, but provided SWS with no supporting structure outside DoD. In effect, CIA and State were left with only implicit responsibilities for warning.
    - At the management end, we placed responsibility on Linc Faurer and Dick Robertson. I think this put them in <sup>A</sup> difficult spot. They already serve two bosses and they don't need a third. They could be and were effective within the DoD, but could not <sup>REALLY</sup> ~~really~~ speak for the DCI at the national level.
  - Thus the first step is to rebuild a national management structure.
5. To this end, the DCI has decided on the following steps. Note that he has made a careful distinction between the management of warning, which is more or less collegial, and the act of warning, which cannot be.

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- ~~He~~ <sup>HE WAS</sup> ~~reassigned~~ <sup>ED</sup> to the DDCI his traditional responsibility as overseer of warning.
- I will head an NFIB-level committee to provide Community coordination at a senior level. (We are not reinventing the Watch Committee. This Committee will not deal with substance, but rather with major matters of policy, management and process.)
- There will be an NIO for Warning who will be the Executive Secretary of this Committee and the DCI's senior staff officer for warning. He has asked Dick Lehman to take this on. Dick will have an assistant from DoD.
- The NIO/W will chair a "Warning Working Group," including senior representatives from DIA, NSA, INR, General Camm's staff, and perhaps other agencies. <sup>AS CUSTOMARY WITH WORKING GROUPS</sup> It will <sup>do</sup> all the work for my Committee. It will not have formal substantive responsibilities, but will provide a network at a senior level for the exchange of agency views and <sup>GRNS</sup> ~~conclusions~~.
- Substantive responsibilities for warning will be centered on the NIO/W. As with all NIOs, he will be primarily a Community officer. He will work, in the first instance, through the other NIOs, among whom he will be primus inter pares.

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- Each NIO already has an informal working group of the senior officers responsible for his area in each agency. He will be expected to convene them periodically, probably monthly, to consider possible troublesome developments and develop appropriate warning. This may include revival of the Alert Memorandum.
  - The Strategic Warning Staff will report to the NIO/W and the "Special Assistant" arrangement will end. The SWS will remain in its present relationship to the NMIC for the time being. Building strong relations between it and the rest of the Community are high on our agenda.
  - Through the NIOs and the SWS, we will develop a warning discipline and sensitization, Community-wide. These arrangements will also provide a means to challenge analyses and develop alternate interpretations.
  - The NIO/W will himself serve as a sort of "ombudsman for warning" for the Community.
6. These arrangements necessarily emphasize organization and mechanisms. Let me emphasize that we can wire together the best

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structure in the world, but when it comes to a crunch, no matter how good is the system, in the end we will have to rely on human judgment. In other words, getting better analysis and better analysts is essential if we are to provide warning.

7. I want also to stress that the DCI has no intention of imposing new designs on the DoD's critical operations in the warning field. What he wants is to use those operations as a major <sup>AR</sup>~~pill~~ of a national structure.

8. Finally, let me say that we are fully conscious that the DCI's office came about to a large extent because there was a Pearl Harbor. Thus, the DCI places warning at the top of his list of priorities. He wishes to place his full authority behind the NIO/W and wants him to proceed all-out to put the system in order. I ask you for full cooperation. There is a great deal to do.

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